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Abstract
Australians could be willing to pay from $878m to $2b per year for Indigenous people to provide environmental services.
This is up to 50 times the amount currently invested by government. This result was derived from a nationwide survey that
included a choice experiment in which 70% of the 927 respondents were willing to contribute to a conservation fund that
directly pays Indigenous people to carry out conservation activities. Of these the highest values were found for benefits that
are likely to improve biodiversity outcomes, carbon emission reductions and improved recreational values. Of the activities
that could be undertaken to provide the services, feral animal control attracted the highest level of support followed by
coastal surveillance, weed control and fire management. Respondents’ decisions to pay were not greatly influenced by the
additional social benefits that can arise for Indigenous people spending time on country and providing the services,
although there was approval for reduced welfare payments that might arise.
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Introduction
The market-based Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is
being held up as a means for reducing poverty in places rich in natural
resources [1,2]. In this paper we assess the willingness of Australian
society to pay for environmental services that can be provided by
Indigenous people on their land in northern Australia and evaluate the
extent to which this is reflected by current levels of investment.We also
investigate which services would attract greatest support and the
reasons why some Australians would rather pay for none at all.
Land management jobs currently available to Indigenous
people in many parts of northern Australia are among the few
available in many communities where poverty underlies a 17 year
gap in life expectancy, high levels of preventable diseases, and
exceptionally low measures of social well-being [3]. Most
Indigenous land management jobs are currently funded by
Government as part of a national five year trial starting in 2008
and worth about US$40 million per year; others are supported by
non-government organisations, businesses and philanthropic
trusts. Payments for land management have particular benefit
for Indigenous people since they allow fulfilment of cultural
responsibilities to traditional lands (caring for country). For
Australian Indigenous people one definition of the health of
country is the physical presence of its traditional owners [4].
However the funding currently available is a fraction of that
required for adequate management: traditional lands make up
over 20% of the Australian continent (about 1.5 million square
kilometres: three times the size of Spain), most of which is
ecologically intact desert and tropical savannah.
Unlike with formal government-owned protected areas, funding
for management of private Indigenous-owned land has not yet
been integrated into mainstream Australian policies even though
the environmental services provided by these lands have wider
benefit for society. PES has become the economic instrument most
commonly used to recognise the value of such services, and to set
the right incentives for their provision [5]. Most existing successful
PES schemes are in developing countries [6] where they have the
potential co-benefit of lifting poor people out of poverty [1,2]. PES
could do the same for Australian Indigenous people. However few
of the PES-like schemes in Australia currently involve Indigenous
people, although their potential for improving social and welfare
conditions in remote Indigenous communities has been recognised
[7,8]. One of the main obstacles is that most Indigenous people
have group rather than individual land ownership and hence
cannot sell their services as private goods [8], such as in bidding
auctions. Also cultivation of Indigenous land for commercial
production is rare, so there is no reason to use conservation money
to set land aside. Thus, in economic terms, opportunity costs for
conserving land are very low. Nevertheless there are numerous
environmental problems on Indigenous-held lands that require
active management if the land is to continue to provide
biodiversity conservation and other environmental services [7].
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [9] and The Economics
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study [10] highlight the
need to assess the value of such environmental services and their
effect on human welfare [11]. Progress in this area has been
impeded, however, by the lack of a standardised classification of
which services to evaluate and how (e.g. [12,13]), partly because it
is often difficult to measure the biophysical outcome of services
provided within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore environ-
mental services often have a public good character and many of
the benefits, in particular those from regulation services (water and
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climate), are non-rival and non-excludable. This leads to under-
estimation of service value, free-riding and under-supply, and
finally exploitation and environmental damage [10]. What can be
measured, however, and what is most important from an
economic point of view, is the benefit these services have to a
wider society ([14], p. 645). Public money should not in principle
be spent on services for which the society gains no benefit and, vice
versa, those who benefit from such services should pay for them
[15]. Assessing the value of environmental benefits can help ensure
public funds are distributed appropriately.
The data were obtained from a nation-wide survey that
included a stated choice experiment [16]. The choice experiment
method allows the monetary quantification of use values as well as
of non-marketable non-use values that are often neglected in
decision making for conservation management [17]. The applied
choice experiment elicited respondents’ willingness-to-pay for
hypothetical Indigenous land management scenarios. With the
chosen experimental design (see Materials and Methods) we were
able to quantify the monetary benefits of three environmental
services – biodiversity, aesthetic/recreational, carbon – as well as
one social/cultural benefit that can occur for those providing the
service (Table 1). Most benefits accrue to non-Indigenous
Australians, who were the main target group for the survey.
Worldwide there have been a few studies using non-market
evaluation techniques to evaluate single services, such as
biodiversity services (e.g. [18]) and only one study that employed
a choice experiment to assess multiple ecosystem services [19]. No
study, to the authors’ knowledge, has assessed willingness-to-pay
specifically for services delivered by Indigenous people.
Results
Response rate
A total of 927 responses to the questionnaire were used in the
final data analysis: 535 (42%) from the online survey and 392
(58%) from the mail survey. This represents an overall response
rate of about 20% following which some responses were dismissed
from the final dataset because respondents had either not attended
to the choice experiment at all, had stated that they did not
understood the experiment and therefore always chose not to pay,
or they self-rated their degree of understanding at less than 4 (on a
scale from 1 to 10 with 10= having understood perfectly).
Respondents’ characteristics
The average age of all respondents was 51 (SD: 15; range 17–
90); 53% were female. Only 2.2% of the respondents were
Indigenous, slightly lower than the national average of 2.6% [20].
Seventeen percent of respondents lived in northern Australia.
Twelve percent of respondents were not at all interested in
Australian Indigenous culture and traditions, 52% were a little bit,
27% quite interested and 7% were fascinated by them.
Values of environmental benefits
The best model (see Materials and Methods) included data on
respondents’ socio-economic background (Table 2), which ex-
plained some of the variation in preferences among respondents.
As expected, respondents chose the cheapest scenario, all else
being equal, but preferences varied greatly among respondents for
all attributes except ‘‘improved health of native animals and
plants’’. Respondents preferred scenarios that ameliorated ‘‘dete-
riorating health of native animal and plants’’ and ‘‘poor
recreational attractiveness’’. The only benefit for Indigenous
people that was significantly favoured, and so kept in the final
model, was ‘‘less dependency’’. ‘‘Better transfer of Indigenous
knowledge’’ and ‘‘better health’’ for those providing the services
were not significant in respondents’ choices. Respondents felt that
they would be substantially worse off from ‘‘deteriorating health of
native animals and plants’’ (2$256) while they were willing to pay
on average $80 for attractive recreational conditions, $79 for
declining greenhouse gas emissions and $24 to improve environ-
mental conditions (Table 2). Females were less likely than males to
choose not to make a contribution to one of the Indigenous land
management scenarios, a result found in other evaluation studies
[21]. The probability of respondents choosing to pay for one of the
two Indigenous land management scenarios varied inversely with
age and increased with level of interest in Indigenous culture.
Respondents who have lived away from northern Australia were
more likely to choose to pay for one of the Indigenous land
management scenarios.
Table 1. Attributes and levels used in a choice experiment to determine Australians willingness-to-pay for Indigenous land
management.
Attribute
Levels for ‘‘Indigenous land
management’’ scenarios
Levels for ‘‘Maintaining current
management’’ scenario (SQ1) Service/Benefit
1) Health of native animal and plant
communities
- Improving
- Stable
- Stable
- Deteriorating
Biodiversity
2) Attractiveness for recreational use - Good
- Fair
- Poor
- Fair
Aesthetic/Recreational
3) Benefits for Indigenous people - Better health
- Better transfer of Indigenous knowledge
- Less dependency on the government
- No additional benefits Social/Cultural
4) Greenhouse gas emissions - Reducing
- Stable
- Increasing
- Stable
Carbon
5) Annual contribution into a
conservation fund (AUS$)
$25, $50, $100, $200, $300 $0
Each of the four attributes represented an environmental service/benefit. The attributes had different levels, some characterising potential Indigenous land
management scenarios and some characterising a scenario resembling the current management. The levels were combined into choice cards (see Figure 1). The fifth
attribute indicated the costs of the scenarios which the respondent would hypothetically be willing to contribute into an Indigenous land management conservation
fund out of which Indigenous people would be paid to provide the services mentioned in the scenarios.
1SQ: Status quo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023154.t001
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Thirty percent of respondents chose not to contribute any
money on all seven choice cards, more than half (56%) because
they thought that the concept of paying Indigenous people to
provide environmental services does not work, while 36%
considered paying for these services to be solely a government
responsibility. Other reasons included the perception that much
money is already donated to environmental causes (17%), a
general refusal to donate (6%) and a simple lack of money
although respondents would have liked to be able to pay (3%).
Preferred activities and aggregated values
From the four activities, which can feasibly be carried out by
Indigenous people, most respondents chose feral animal control
(37%) over coastal surveillance (20%), weed control (18%) and fire
management (14%). Some respondents (6%) did not select any of
the four activities but commented that all four are equally
important and need to be carried out simultaneously. All four
activities are complementary and provide, probably to a different
but at the moment unknown extent, biodiversity, carbon and
recreational benefits to the broader society. To assess the benefit of
one individual activity, we multiplied the sum of the three
environmental mean values derived from the choice experiment
by the number of people who might pay and multiplied that by the
percentage of respondents who selected the activity as most
important. The total economic value the average respondent
would receive from any of the four activities was $183 ($24 for
improved biodiversity; $80 for improved recreational attractive-
ness; $79 for declining greenhouse gas emissions – Table 2).
Although the aggregation of values to the wider society has its
limitations [22,23], it has to be done if benefit values are to be
compared with the costs [23], in this case those needed to
implement a PES program for Indigenous-held land in northern
Australia. If the average WTP across the sampled population were
levied as a tax (see Materials and Methods) about $2.0b per year
would be available with $878m (lower bound, assuming 70% of
non-respondents had zero WTP) to $1.4b (upper bound, non-
respondents ignored) per year being available from a voluntary
scheme. If this money was allocated to different activities
according to peoples’ preferences the following money would be
available for the following activities to be carried out by
Indigenous people: feral animal control: $745m (as a tax)/
$325m–$521m (voluntary payments); coastal surveillance:
$403m/$176m–$282m; weed control $362m/$158m–$253m;
and fire management $282m/$123m–$197m.
Discussion
Government initiatives for Indigenous land management
(Working on Country, Indigenous Rangers, Indigenous Protected
Areas) currently provide about $40 million per year [24]. This
budget is only secure until 2013 but knowing that the beneficiaries
of the environmental services emerging from this program are
Table 2. Results of a choice experiment to determine the willingness of Australian people to pay for Indigenous people to manage
land and generate environmental services.
Model parameters Welfare estimates1 ($)
Variable Coefficient SD Mean CI
Deteriorating health of native animals and plants 22.61*** 7.99*** 2256 2803–287
Improving health of native animals and plants 0.22*** 1.20*** 24 259–103
Low attractiveness for recreation 20.81*** 3.51*** 275 2317–157
High attractiveness for recreation 0.79*** 0.85*** 80 22–137
Less dependency on government for Indigenous people 20.51*** 0.59*** 250 290–211
Declining GHG2 emissions 0.77*** 1.09*** 79 4–151
Increasing GHG emissions 0.42*** 0.29 42 23–62
Costs 20.01*** 0.01***
Constant for SQ3 21.07***
SQ * North Australia 1.67***
SQ * Female 20.43***
SQ * Age 0.04***
SQ * Interest in Indigenous culture 21.21***
Model fit:
Log-likelihood 25005.14
Pseudo R-squared 0.29
Number of observations 6437
Number of respondents 927
Halton draws 200
The standard deviations (SD) are given for those attributes which were set as random in the model. The interaction terms of the status quo (SQ) scenario and socio-
economic parameters were set as non-random. The welfare estimates provided a monetary estimate of the benefits/disbenefits people believed they will receive from
the services.
***, **, * Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
1The estimates are in AUS$ which is almost equal to the US$ (May 2011: 1US$= 0.95 AUS$).
2GHG: Greenhouse Gas.
3SQ: Status quo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023154.t002
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willing to pay up to 50 times this amount is an argument for its
continuity. The difficulty is translating this WTP into increased
funds for Indigenous land management. A nation-wide tax scheme
would force people to pay unwillingly. Ironically resistance to such
a tax is likely to be greatest among the people who live in or visit
northern Australia, i.e. those who potentially benefit most from at
least some of the services, such as improved recreational
conditions. This study showed that these people were less likely
to support the funding of Indigenous people to provide
environmental services than people living in distant southern
Australia, which contrasts with studies elsewhere showing an
inverse relationship between distance and the amount people are
willing to pay for such services (e.g. [25]). This negative attitude
among northern residents and visitors also mitigates against raising
annual fees for ‘‘consuming’’ recreational and biodiversity benefits
in northern Australia. Although fees are indeed levied in some
protected areas, where visitors are required to purchase entry
permits, the amounts collected are well below the costs of
expanding Indigenous land management.
Instead the greatest value from Indigenous land management is
to those in southern Australian who have not benefited directly
from the north Australian environment, and may never do so. For
this sector voluntary WTP may be translated into actual benefits
for service providers most equitably and efficiently through
agreements between traditional landowners and private compa-
nies. In particular northern Australia could become very attractive
in the future to those wishing to invest in schemes for reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases, for which examples already exist
[26].
Another potential source of land management funding is savings
that arise from improvements in health among Indigenous people
that occur when they spend more time caring for country. For
example, substantial savings are realised from reduction in the
incidence of diabetes, heart disease and renal failure as
engagement with land management increases [27]. Given the
health benefits, some health funds could be redirected to
Indigenous land management, reducing the amount needed from
donations to conservation schemes [7]. However the respondents
were more enthusiastic about a reduced dependence on welfare
among Indigenous people than the health benefits that might
accrue to them. The most likely reason for this is that the
knowledge of such benefits is not yet widely known. The study
cited [27] is one of just a handful of recent studies formally linking
health gains to caring for country, and the first to quantify
economic savings.
While our study focused on the value of the services provided to
non-Indigenous people, more research is needed to investigate the
willingness of Indigenous people to participate and how they
would like to be compensated for their work. While the needs of
those who would pay (mostly non-Indigenous people) eventually
have to match the services that are provided, the capacity and
willingness of Indigenous people to provide the services is critical
to any PES scheme’s success. Given that Indigenous people have
demonstrated a determination to meeting cultural obligations to
their country despite the disincentive of poor services in remote
areas [28], the strict assumptions of conventional PES schemes as
conditional, well defined and voluntary [29] may need to be
reconsidered. Hence, evaluating environmental services from a
benefit-based approach, as we have done in this study, may be
more appropriate than a rigid contractual link between the
services to be provided and the manner in which this is to occur.
Taking into account Indigenous understanding of their environ-
ment is particularly important. Although we show that respon-
dents have preferences for some activities they would like to have
carried out for their money, such as pest control, Indigenous
people will often know best how to achieve the benefits from their
services. Despite these caveats this research has demonstrated that
Australians may be willing to pay Indigenous people far more than
they currently do to prevent deterioration of the environment in
northern Australia.
Materials and Methods
Data collection and ethics statement
We used a structured questionnaire which consisted of three
parts: 1) questions related to respondents’ socio-economic status
including attitudinal questions, 2) the choice experiment including
prior information on activities that Indigenous people commonly
carry out on their land and their potential benefits, and 3) follow-
up questions from the choice experiment. The questionnaires were
distributed to 4,600 people across Australia; 3,000 questionnaires
were mailed to mostly urban addresses in southern Australia and
1,000 to addresses across northern Australia which is where most
Indigenous ranger employment is occurring. All mail-out address-
es were randomly selected from the telephone directory. An online
version of the same questionnaire was distributed to 560
respondents by an Online market company. Online recipients
were randomly approached by the Online market company within
predefined strata, ensuring that the sample population represented
an equal gender ratio, a full range of age categories and all main
urban regions in Australia. Ethics approval for the survey was
obtained from the Charles Darwin University Human Research
Ethics Committee (EC00154). A letter in plain English language
explaining the purpose of the survey, how to complete it and
stating that the survey was voluntary and anonymous accompa-
nied each questionnaire. By answering and returning the
questionnaire respondents were assumed to have given consent.
Choice experimental design
In a choice experiment respondents are asked to choose
between alternative scenarios, defined in terms of their attributes.
In our experimental design we described the attributes in terms of
benefits from environmental services from Indigenous land
management (Table 1). These benefits and the levels were selected
after interviews with key informants and a pre-test period. The
benefits have various levels that vary from scenario to scenario
according to specific design rules. In this study there were always
three scenarios to choose from (Figure 1) on one choice card. First
of all these were two Indigenous land management scenarios
which would improve or stabilise environmental conditions and
benefit the Indigenous people providing the services. These two
scenarios came with a putative personal cost to the respondents.
Including this cost attribute, described as an annual one-off
contribution per household into a conservation fund from which
Indigenous people would be paid to provide the environmental
services, enabled the calculation of welfare estimates. The third
scenario (‘‘Maintain current management’’, the status-quo scenario)
described as a situation in which no additional money would be
available for employing Indigenous people to work on country
with a probable result that environmental conditions would at best
stay stable, and would probably deteriorate.
The specified number of attributes and their levels (Table 1)
allowed many potential combinations into scenarios and choice
cards. Since it was impractical to use them all, we applied a
Bayesian approach to obtain a statistically efficient design with 30
choice cards, using the software Ngene. Efficient designs aim to
provide data that generates parameter estimates with standard
errors as small as possible [30]. Efficient designs, now used
Environmental Services on Indigenous-Held Lands
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 August 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 8 | e23154
commonly for choosing the best experimental design [31], will
outperform other commonly used designs if any prior information
on the parameters is available, even if the priors are mis-specified
[30]. We derived prior parameter information from a pilot phase
with 30 respondents which we used to create the final design. The
Bayesian D-error of the final design was 0.018.
From the 30 choice cards only 21 were used after behaviourally
unrealistic cards and those requiring no trade-offs were removed.
The remaining 21 cards were randomly blocked into three
versions and each respondent was given seven choice cards in a
questionnaire. Each version was used the same number of times.
In addition, we accounted for a potential left-right bias by
alternating the order of appearance of the two Indigenous land
management scenarios on the choice cards.
Data analysis
Data was analysed using the software package Limdep Nlogit
4.0 and all attribute variables but the cost attribute were dummy-
coded (0/1). Lancaster’ s characteristics theory of value [32] and
random utility theory (RUT) [33], in which respondents make
discrete choices from a set of scenarios which reflect their probable
behaviour, underpin the choice experiment approach. RUT states
that respondent j’s utility for scenario i consists of two parts, an
observable and deterministic part Xjib and an unobservable part
eji [34]:
Uji~Xjibzeji
where Xji is a matrix of scenario i’s attributes and b is a vector of
unknown coefficients associated with these attributes. eji is the iid
(independently and identically distributed) maximum extreme
value type I distribution error term [16,35]. According to RUT,
respondents will chose the scenario out of a choice card that gives
them the highest utility. Based on this assumption, the conditional
logit model can be formed [16]:
Probji~exp uXjib
 
Sum exp uXjib
  
The scale vector u is assumed to equal one (implying constant
error variance) so that the model becomes deterministic and the
b’s can be identified. We applied random parameter logit (RPL)
models because of their flexibility with respect to iid error terms, to
address unobserved preference heterogeneity [36] and to take full
advantage of panel data. We compared different models using log-
likelihood ratio tests.
The welfare estimation (here the benefit values) of the four
individual services can then be carried out by calculating the ratio
2bj/bcost, where bj is the coefficient for an attribute j in the choice
card and bcost is the attribute associated with the money
respondents would pay for the chosen scenarios (here annual
contribution into a conservation fund for Indigenous land
management). These ratios can be calculated for each attribute
level while holding the other attributes at the same levels. For RPL
models the welfare estimates are approximated via simulations
[16,37]. Using the parametric bootstrapping technique [38] we
estimated a distribution of 10,000 observations for each welfare
estimate by drawing from a multivariate normal distribution
parameterised with the coefficient and standard deviation
obtained from the models. This method also provides the 95%
confidence intervals for each welfare estimate.
Aggregation of values
To aggregate we considered two approaches for collecting the
money needed to pay for Indigenous provision of environmental
services: a national tax paid by every employed Australian (11 m
people [20]) and a voluntary payment scheme. For the voluntary
scheme we calculated a lower and upper bound. For the upper
bound we assumed that 70% of taxpayers (about 7.7 m people),
based on those willing to pay in this survey, are willing to pay the
amounts they specified in the survey. In this case we did not
consider those respondents who did not send back the question-
naire or did not fill out the online survey. For the lower bound we
followed the method proposed by Morrison [22] and assumed that
the proportion of non-respondents who did not send back the
questionnaire had the same WTP as the respondents.
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Figure 1. Example of a choice card used to test the willingness to pay for Indigenous provision of environmental services in
northern Australia. The choice cards represented hypothetical scenarios of potential benefits from Indigenous land management. Respondents
were presented with six cards, each showing different combinations of the levels. Each choice card provided three scenarios (represented by the
three columns) characterised by five attributes (represented by the five rows). The column on the right always represented a situation in which
current land management is maintained. The attribute in the last row represented the costs of a scenario while the other four attributes represented
environmental services provided by Indigenous people. By choosing their preferred scenario each time, respondents made trade-offs between the
attributes/environmental services and therefore indirectly stated their willingness-to-pay for each environmental service.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023154.g001
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